The U.S. intelligence community has completed and is
circulating a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear
weapons program that walks back the conclusion of the 2007 NIE, which stated
that Iran had halted work on its covert nuclear weapons program.
Intelligence officials briefed executive branch
policymakers on the revised NIE last week. The document is being shared with
members of Congress and their staff this week, an administration official and
several Capitol Hill sources told The
Cable. This is in advance of an early March meeting of the International
Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors, where there may be another
resolution on Iran's nuclear program, the official said.
The 2007 NIE was attacked in public due to its conclusion: "We judge with
high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
program." The new estimate might not directly contradict that judgment,
Hill sources report, but could say that while the intelligence community has
not determined that Iran has made the strategic decision to build a nuclear
weapon, it is working on the components of such a device.
Several sources said they are being told there will
be no declassified version of the new NIE, and that only those cleared to read
the full 2007 NIE (pdf)
will be able to see the new version.
"It does exist," House Intelligence Committee
chairman Mike Rogers (R-MI) said in
an interview with The Cable. Rogers
said the administration was right to take its time to revise the 2007 NIE
before releasing the updated version. "Intelligence is a fluid thing, sometimes
you get great stuff and sometimes you don't get great stuff to make good
conclusions. I think they were prudent in what they've done."
House Foreign Affairs ranking Democrat Howard
Berman (D-CA) told The Cable he
had heard the new NIE would walk back the controversial conclusions of the 2007
version, but that he hadn't read it yet. Regardless, he said, the 2007 Iran NIE
was now obsolete and discredited.
"Nobody had been paying attention to the older NIE.
A few people on the outside focused on it because they didn't want us to go
down the sanctions route but neither the administration nor the Congress paid
it much attention," Berman said. "I thought the NIE estimate then was a faulty
one because it focused on some aspects of weaponization -- even as Iran was
continuing to enrich."
Revelations that Iran had a secret uranium
enrichment facility at Qom, which occurred after the release of the 2007 NIE,
were further proof that the Iranian regime was pursing nuclear weapons, Berman
said. Regardless, the Obama administration has disregarded the 2007 Iran NIE,
he said.
"For a year and a half the administration has been
convinced that Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapon. That's what they whole
sanctions push is based on," Berman said. "There can be no serious doubt that
Iran wants to have a nuclear weapons capability."
Sen. Mark
Kirk (R-IL), a former intelligence officer for the U.S. Navy, told The Cable, "The 2007 NIE was a
mistake," and
this document appears to be more realistic. He urged the intelligence community
to take a less technical and more comprehensive look at the Iranian
leadership's actions when making such judgments.
"My hope is that the current leaders of the
intelligence community look not just at technical details and also comment
regularly on Iran's leaders," Kirk said. "In Intelligence 101 we are taught to
measure both capability and intent politically, and the intent here on the part
of the Iranian regime is pretty clear."
Several lawmakers refused to discuss the new NIE
because it was classified or because they hadn't read it yet. Senate Armed
Services Committee ranking Republican John
McCain (R-AZ) told The Cable he
had been briefed on the new NIE, but declined to comment on its contents.
Senate Intelligence Committee chairwoman Dianne
Feinstein (D-CA) told The Cable
she hadn't yet seen the new NIE but planned to review it soon.
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI), who supported the
conclusions in the 2007 NIE, contended that the old estimate was misconstrued
as an attempt by its authors to head off an attack against Iran by the Bush
administration.
"I think it was interpreted incorrectly," Levin told
The Cable.
The NIE is compiled by the National
Intelligence Council, but rollout and classification
decisions are ultimately made by Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper.
Senator Kirk's comment about "Intelligence 101" is perplexing. Before making his comment suggesting his infinite knowledge of intelligence, he suggested that the IC take a more comprehensive look with the NIE. I am not sure how exactly this is possible when NIEs represent the considered opinion of the ENTIRE IC and, once completed and agreed to, are signed by the DNI.
In the classic textbook for Senator Kirk's "Intelligence 101" (Mark Lowenthal's work), it is clear to the student of intelligence that NIEs are long-term intelligence products that attempt to estimate (not predict) the likely direction an issue will take in the future.
If the issue (in this case Iranian nuclear weapons production) demands current analysis, it is distributed through other analytical vehicles or via a SNIE.
Senator Kirk has betrayed significant misunderstandings of the estimative process. NIEs are not certainties, they remain subject to change as the authors of the 2007 NIE admit.
The new NIE has clearly become politicized and on the absence of evidence of a nuclear weapons program, those behind it's politicization have trying to make the case about the intentions of the Iranian regime.
From the report:
“Sen. Mark Kirk (R-IL), a former intelligence officer for the U.S. Navy, told The Cable, "The 2007 NIE was a mistake," and this document appears to be more realistic. He urged the intelligence community to take a less technical and more comprehensive look at the Iranian leadership's actions when making such judgements. “
Kirk calls the 2007 NIE a mistake (not flawed) but does not refute it's conclusions, which implies he believed it was a political mistake to release it.
Berman is merely parroting a political policy.
He makes the statement that the 2007 NIE was a faulty because it focused on weaponization, and tries to argue that because ran was continuing to enrich, that this in itself is proof of a weapons program. That enrichment program is taking place under the supervision of the IAEA who continue to report it's compliance with the NPT (as they have just done for the 26th time).
Berman's statement that "There can be no serious doubt that Iran wants to have a nuclear weapons capability" is simply Rumself revisited all over again. There is actually no serious evidence (or any evidence for that matter) that proves Iran wants to have nuclear weapons, so Berman is simply making baseless accusations.
Josh Rogin reports on national security and foreign policy from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, the White House to Embassy Row, for The Cable.
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