When General David
Petraeus testifies today on Capitol Hill, his main job will be to carefully
define the timeline for the beginning of America's exit from Afghanistan, a
timeline that has stakeholders in Washington and throughout the region confused
and concerned.
"As the President has stated, July 2011 is the point at
which we will begin a transition phase in which the Afghan government will take
more and more responsibility for its own security," Petraeus wrote in his advanced
questions submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee and obtained by The Cable. "As the President has also
indicated, July 2011 is not a date when we will be rapidly withdrawing our
forces and -switching off the lights and closing the door behind us."
His job will also be to defend President Obama's decision to
set a public date for the beginning of the withdrawal in the first place, by
arguing that having a time line in the public discussion helps pressure the
Afghans to move faster toward being able to govern and secure their country on
their own.
"I believe there was value in sending a message of urgency
-- July 2011... But it is important that July 2011 be seen for what it is: the date when a process begins, in which the
reduction of US forces must be based on the conditions at the time, and not a
date when the U.S. heads for the exits," he wrote to the committee. He stressed
that multiple times that the pace of the drawdown would be "conditions based."
But even in his own writing to the committee, Petraeus
acknowledged that the enemy, the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan,
are waiting out the coalition and biding their time until foreign forces decide
to leave.
"Insurgent leaders view their tactical and operational
losses in 2010 as inevitable and acceptable.
The Taliban believe they can outlast the Coalition's will to fight and
believe this strategy will be effective despite short-term losses. The Taliban also believe they can sustain
momentum and maintain operational capacity," he wrote.
One of the main enablers of any U.S. exit is the development
of the Afghan National Security Forces, which has not gone at the pace the
coalition had hoped. Petraeus wrote that he would review the situation of the
ANSF within four months of assuming command, if confirmed.
As of the latest review, only 5 out of 19 Afghan National
Army brigades can function without a majority of their functions supported by the
U.S., according to Petraeus, and only 2 out of 7 major headquarters can
function properly without significant coalition support. As of June 27, there
are 7,261 ANA troops in the city of Kandahar and 6,794 Afghan soldiers in
Helmand province, Petraeus wrote.
He also said that a comprehensive plan to reintegrate some
Taliban fighters is under final review with President Hamid Karzai and "offers the potential to reduce violence and
provide realistic avenues to assimilate Pashtun insurgents back into
Afghanistan society."
Petraeus promised to take a look at the rules of engagement
that U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan feel are tying their hands in the fight, but
he didn't say whether he was leaning toward changing them or not.
Meanwhile, confusion over the president's timeline persists
both in Washington and abroad as interested parties try to interpret the July
2011 date in a way that serves their own political interests.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-CA, said Monday that
there would be "a
serious drawdown" next summer, seemingly getting ahead of the administration
in an effort to appease the liberal wing of her caucus, which is threatening to
not support more funding for the war.
Two of the committee members Petraeus will face today, Sens.
John McCain, R-AZ, and Lindsey Graham, R-SC, held a press
conference Thursday to announce
their opposition to setting any public date, no matter what the caveats.
Foreign leaders are especially confused, particularly the
Afghan and Pakistani governments, who see a difference between public promises
of drawdowns and private assurances from the administration that the July 2011
date would not precipitate large scale troop reductions.
One high level diplomatic source said that Pakistani and Afghan
leaders believe that they were told by National Security Advisor Jim Jones that there was not going to
be a big withdrawal and the there would be "no reduction in commitment" in July
2011.
But regardless of whether the administration sent mixed
messages, the nuance of their time line policy has been misunderstood or
ignored in the region, as various actors start to plan strategies with the
expectation that U.S. troops are leaving.
"In retrospect, despite all the caveats, it was a mistake to
put such a date certain for the beginning of withdrawal," said Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia
Center at the Atlantic Council. "The word beginning was lost and it strengthens
the ability of different interests to hedge, which is exactly what they've been
doing."
After having denied existence of Mullah Omar’s QST umpteen times on its soil, now Pakistan suddenly finds a way to bring about reconciliation between QST and Afghan government! The most breath-taking part of this is that US is NOT holding Pakistan responsible for sheltering, protecting and supporting Haqqani’s HQN network and Mullah Omar’s QST network all these years while those networks have been causing daily deaths of US/NATO soldiers ever since 2002 even though Pakistan was SUPPOSED to have joined US fight against same Taliban back in 2001!
Defense Secretary Robert Gates justified Pakistan’s terrorist connections, alluding to a “deficit of trust” between Washington, DC and Islamabad. Mr Gates also said that there was “some justification” for Pakistan's concerns about past American policies. Gen David Patraeus, rushed in with an apologia for his Pakistani friends, by claiming that while Faisal was inspired by militants in Pakistan, he did not necessarily have contacts with the militants which is proven to be wrong. Both Adm Mike Mullen and Gen Patraeus fancy themselves to be “soldier statesmen” a la Gen Dwight Eisenhower. Adm Mullen has visited Pakistan 15 times and Gen Patraeus no less frequently. Both evidently have high opinions of their abilities to persuade Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to crack down on the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Taliban’s Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura.
All American officers in southern Afghanistan know that they can not prevail in the ongoing military operations, unless Taliban strongholds across the Durand Line in North Waziristan and Baluchistan are neutralized. Adm Mullen and Gen Patraeus evidently do not want to acknowledge that hard options have to be considered if their soldiers are not to die at the hands of radicals, armed and trained across the Durand Line. This is where rubber meets the road for the famed General.
According to Afghan Taliban commanders’ interviews with Matt Waldman, a Harvard Professor, the Pakistani ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the Taliban insurgency movement. The Afghan Taliban commanders also say that ISI gives sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies. In the words of these Afghan Taliban commanders, this is ‘as clear as the sun in the sky’.
Pakistani government issued its usual denials just as it had denied umpteen times the existence of Mullah Mohammed Omar’s ‘Quetta Shura Taliban (QST)’ in the provincial capital Quetta of Baluchistan. But General Stanley McChrystal confirmed the existence of QST in his report to President Obama in August, 2009 as follows: ‘Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta , the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan . At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year‘.
US can NOT afford to forget either that "The PAKISTANI MILITARY ORGANIZED AND SUPPORTED THE TALIBAN TO TAKE CONTROL OF AFGHANISTAN IN 1996“ as confirmed by even UN report on Bhutto killing released on 4/15/2010. So Mullah Mohammed Omar’s QST and Haqqani’s HQN are essentially Pakistani puppets, dancing to the tune of Pakistan.
Unless and until Gates, Mullen and Petraeus trio is willing to accept that Pakistan is a ‘problem’ rather than a ‘solution’, US Afghan mission will continue to suffer.
Quite a time passed since the whole story unfolded and what do we see? General shift of strategy, any great achievements? I doubt. Seems that author of this article (http://is.gd/dtckx) was right — Petraeus-McChrystal story was about trading bad for worse.
As for the withdrawal timetable — I bet my watch and wallet, they gonna fail with that once again.
Josh Rogin reports on national security and foreign policy from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, the White House to Embassy Row, for The Cable.
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